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Abstract 
 
 
This paper contributes to the literature that highlights the role of trading partners’ institutions for a 
country’s unemployment rate. The objective is to study whether the results established in the minimum 
wage setting of Davis (1998) hold when unemployment is driven by search frictions. This paper finds 
that relative labor market institutions matter for equilibrium unemployment as they generate 
comparative advantages, but there are two main differences with Davis. With North-North trade, 
unemployment decreases in the low-regulation country. When South is brought into the picture, low-
regulation North is not insulated, and unemployment increases in both developed countries as a result 
of specialization.  
 
Keywords:  Unemployment, Labor Market Institutions, Trade 
 
JEL Classification: F16, J50, F10, F41  
 
 
* I am grateful to Matthieu Crozet, Romain Duval, Cyril Nouveau, Joaquim Oliveira-Martins and the 
participants of the Fourgeaud seminar for their helpful comments, as well as to the editor and two 
anonymous referees for having provided guidance to upgrade the paper substantially.  
 
** 13 rue de Chabrol – 75010 Paris – France – 00 33 1 45 24 84 58 – herve.boulhol@oecd.org 
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2010.91
 1 
 
 
 
Résumé 
 
 
Cet article est une contribution à la littérature soulignant l’influence des institutions des partenaires 
commerciaux sur le taux de chômage d’un pays. L’objectif est d’étudier dans quelle mesure les 
résultats établis par Davis (1998) dans le cadre d’un modèle avec salaire minimum sont maintenus 
lorsque le chômage est dû à des frictions d’appariement. Ce papier montre que les institutions 
relatives du marché du travail affectent le taux de chômage d’équilibre dans la mesure où elles 
engendrent des avantages comparatifs, mais avec deux différences importantes par rapport à Davis. 
Avec du commerce Nord-Nord, le chômage baisse dans le pays faiblement réglementé. Lorsque le 
Sud est introduit, le pays du Nord légèrement réglementé est affecté, et le chômage augmente dans 
les deux pays du Nord à la suite de la spécialisation.   
 
Mots-clés: Chômage, Institutions du marché du travail, Commerce 
 
Classification JEL: F16, J50, F10, F41  
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 “A more subtle – but by this more important – reason for considering a global 
approach is that the consequences even of purely local institutions and 
shocks often depend crucially on the links to the global market” 
Donald Davis  
 
 
1. Introduction 
The impact of labor market institutions on unemployment is generally assessed without taking into 
account increasing international economic linkages between countries. Despite globalization, most 
researchers focus on domestic labor market regulation to explain differences in unemployment rates 
both across countries and through time. This choice is motivated by theories of unemployment based 
on job search frictions, according to which more stringent domestic labor market regulation raises 
unemployment, an explanation herein referred to as the “regulation view“. In doing so, the effect of 
foreign labor market institutions on domestic unemployment is thus ignored. 
 
In their seminal paper, Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) highlight that, even though labor market 
institutions could explain much of the differences in unemployment across countries either in the 
1980s or the 1990s, changes in institutions were too small to account for the changes in 
unemployment rates. Blanchard and Wolfers find evidence that the mostly common shocks that 
affected developed countries, such as changes in real interest rate and productivity growth, had 
differentiated impacts on unemployment rates based on differences in labor market institutions. The 
rationale is, first, that rigidities can delay the adjustment of wages in the advent of negative shocks, 
which might generate unemployment, and, second, that differences in rigidities are related to 
differences in institutions. In contrast, Saint-Paul (2004) argues that changes in institutions have been 
significant in the last decades and can explain by themselves the magnitude of the trends in 
unemployment rates.1 In turn, Blanchard (2006) considers that these explanations are only partly 
satisfactory and encourages researchers to consider other shocks and other interactions.  
                                                 
1
 The most comprehensive effort to match the changes in unemployment rates with those in institutions is probably that of 
Nickell, Nunziata and Ochiel (2005) who find support for the regulation view and assess that the shock interactions à la 
Blanchard-Wolfers are not robust once added to their thorough specification. On the other hand, Baker, Glyn, Howell and 
Schmitt (2005) and Baccaro and Rei (2005) present a sceptical analysis of the evidence produced in support of the regulation 
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This domestic focus is surprising given the prominent attention placed on the employment 
consequences of globalization in the public and political debate. Theoretically, Brecher (1974) shows 
how labor market rigidities generated by a binding minimum wage are magnified by international trade, 
and Davis (1998), building on Brecher’s idea, draws attention to the key interactions between labor 
market institutions designed at the country level and global goods markets.2 In a stylized trade model 
between flexible wage “America” and minimum wage “Europe”, Davis shows that trade ties up factor 
prices between countries and leads to an increase in long-term unemployment in “Europe”. Davis’ 
main intuition lies in the fact that “even when factor markets are strictly national, with idiosyncratic 
institutional features, they cannot be considered in isolation when goods markets are global”. There is 
a major difference between the Blanchard-Wolfers hypothesis and the Brecher-Davis mechanism. The 
former seems implicitly optimistic in that the effects of labor market institutions, albeit persistent, are 
not a long-term phenomenon since “bad” institutions merely slow the necessary adjustments. In 
contrast, the Brecher-Davis interactions between trade and labor market institutions affect the 
unemployment rate in the long run. 
 
The effects of a country’s labor market regulations on its trading partners are the subject of a growing 
attention. Davidson and Matusz (2005), Moore and Ranjan (2005) and Cuñat and Melitz (2007) 
provide evidence that labor market institutions affect comparative advantages. Boulhol (2009) and 
Helpman and Itskhoki (2010) highlight how trade liberalisation affects unemployment through 
specialisation effects when countries differ in either union power or hiring costs, respectively. For 
example in Boulhol (2009), the threat of relocations, which trade integration makes even more 
credible, encourages labor market deregulation in the highly-regulated country to avoid capital 
outflows, thus leading to a decrease in unemployment. In an earlier contribution, Davidson, Martin and 
Matusz (1999) show that trade liberalisation between two countries, one of which is a capital-abundant 
large country with a more efficient labor market, leads to higher unemployment in that country. In 
these models, labor market regulation typically affects sectors asymmetrically, which generates 
                                                                                                                                                        
view. Following a rigorous empirical strategy, Bassanini and Duval (2006) reach more moderate conclusions as for the role of 
institutions, either directly or through the interactions with shocks. 
2
  In a different context, Krugman (1995) emphasizes that the impact of trade with developing countries on wages and 
employment depends on the functioning of the labor market: trade effects are likely to be mostly reflected by changes in wages 
in flexible economies and in employment in rigid ones. 
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comparative advantages when either labor market institutions or factor endowments differ across 
countries. Dutt, Mitra and Ranjan (2009) focus on trade between countries having different 
development levels with search-generated unemployment. They show that unemployment increases 
with trade in the labor-scarce country if comparative advantages arise from differences in factor 
endowments, but decreases if they are based on relative technological differences, and find empirical 
support for the latter.  
    
The current paper is part of the still nascent literature trying to incorporate unemployment in trade 
models. Its main contribution consists in investigating the extent to which Davis’ main idea can be 
generalized to a broader type of labor market institutions than the simple minimum wage context. 
Using the two-factor matching framework of Pissarides (2000), the model developed herein highlights 
that foreign labor market institutions affect a country’s unemployment rate through the trade channel. 
The main mechanism through which institutions of trading partners influence unemployment is 
straightforward. To the extent that labor market institutions matter for unemployment, they affect the 
cost of labor and, therefore, relative factor and good prices. It follows that labor market regulation 
contributes to comparative advantages in an open economy.  
 
More specifically, the paper brings three main results. First, in the case of trade between two 
developed countries, as in Davis, the high-regulation (“rigid”) country that has relative high labor costs 
tends to specialize in the capital-intensive good and unemployment increases as a result of the 
induced fall in labor demand. Second, and this is the main difference with Davis in the North-North 
context, the “flexible” economy benefits from trade with the “rigid” country in terms of total 
employment, through the induced increase in demand for the labor intensive good. Through trade and 
induced changes in factor prices, comparative advantages in labor market institutions enable the 
“flexible” economy to transfer some of the search-friction costs to the “rigid” economy. Third, when 
South is introduced to this North-North equilibrium, overall specialization results from the combination 
of endowment- and institution-driven comparative advantages. In the case where the endowment 
effect dominates, labor-abundant South specializes in the labor-intensive good. Consequently, 
unemployment decreases in the developing country and increases in both developed countries from 
their North-North equilibrium levels: in contrast with Davis, the “rigid” developed country does not 
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absorb the whole permanent shock related to trade with South, and “flexible” North is also negatively 
affected in terms of employment. Combining North-North with North-South trade, the unemployment 
rate rises unambiguously from the autarky level in high-regulation North, whereas the total effect is 
ambiguous for low-regulation North.   
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 extends the matching model to a two-sector 
economy. Section 3 embeds this framework into a standard trade model focusing on North-North 
trade, while Section 4 introduces a labor abundant country into the picture. Finally, Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2. A two-sector extension of Pissarides’ matching framework  
This section embeds the large-firm version of the matching model of Pissarides (2000, chapter 3), 
which captures the main features of the regulation view, into a two-sector model. Each sector 
produces a homogeneous good under perfect competition. There are two factors of production, capital 
K  and labor L . The two factors could alternatively be thought of as being skilled and low skilled 
labor, as in Davis, with rigidities affecting mainly low skilled labor. This framework lays the ground for 
an extension of the Heckscher-Ohlin trade model to search frictions, which is developed in section 3. 
 
Firms are identical within each sector, and sector 1 produces the capital-intensive good of price p  in 
terms of good 2, which is chosen as the numeraire.3 Let ijK  and ijL  be the capital and employment of 
firm i  in sector j , and let ),( ijijj LKF  be the constant returns-to-scale production function of all firms 
in that sector. Each firm is large enough so that there is no uncertainty about its flow of labor, and 
unemployed workers are assumed to be perfectly mobile across sectors. Wages are bargained at the 
individual level and firms choose the number of jobs by taking the bargained wages as given. Labor 
market characteristics are assumed to be identical in both sectors.4 While employed workers might be 
                                                 
3
 As goods are homogenous, all firms within the same sector set the same price. 
4
 There are two reasons for this assumption. The first one is analytical simplicity. The second is that the impact of differences in 
labour market features across sectors on trade specialization has been studied elsewhere, as pointed out in the introduction. 
For example, Boulhol (2009) and Helpman amd Itskhorski (2010) consider differences in bargaining power and hiring costs, 
respectively. In these papers, the analytical complexity is resolved by assuming that there is no imperfection in one sector (i.e. it 
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attached to the sector in which they work due to search frictions, it is assumed that unemployed 
workers have no attachment to a specific sector: they randomly take the first job possible. Hence, 
during a small interval dt , a vacant job is matched to an unemployed worker with the same probability 
dtm )(θ  in both sectors, where (.)m  is the matching function which decreases with labor market 
tightness, θ , defined as the ratio of total vacancy to unemployment rates. Usual properties of the 
matching function, discussed at greater length in Pissarides (2000), are supposed to hold: 
)()(',0)(' θθθθ mmm <<                                                                                         (1) 
such that )(θθ m  increases with θ . It is assumed that labor market tightness is exogenous to the 
firm’s control and that each firm loses workers at the exogenous separation rate λ . Each vacancy 
costs the firm h  in recruitment costs and returns a worker at the rate )(θm . Therefore, denoting ijV  
the vacancies at firm i in sector j , the law of motion of job is: 
ijijij VmLL )(θλ +−=&                                                                                                       (2) 
Aggregating across all firms in each sector shows that in the steady-state: 
)(// θλ mLV jj =                                                                                                            (3) 
Summing across sectors gives the steady-state unemployment rate: 
)(θθλ
λ
m
u
+
=                                                                                                                 (4) 
Unambiguously, given (4), the unemployment rate is negatively related to labor market tightness.5  
 
I  representing the investment of price Kp , δ  the depreciation rate of capital stock, w  the gross 
wage, h  the cost of a vacant position  and r  the discount rate, firm i  in sector j  maximizes the 
present-discounted value of expected profits: 
[ ]∫∞ − −−−=Π 0, ),( dtIphVLwLKFpeMax ijKijijjijijjjrtijIV jiij   with   pp =1  and 12 =p         (5) 
                                                                                                                                                        
is always possible to find a job in that sector). Differences between countries in labor market institutions (of the other sector) 
influence specialization. In contrast here, specialization is determined by the interactions between sectoral factor intensities and 
labour market institutions, which differ between countries but not across sectors.     
5
 For example, referring to the previous footnote, if one allows for different separation rates across sectors, equation (4) remains 
valid, but with )1( 1211 ss −+= λλλ where 1s  is share of employment in sector 1, which is affected by specialization. 
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                        s.c.  ijijijijijij VmLLKIK )(, θλδ +−=−= &&  
Let ijijij LKk /≡  be the capital per unit of labor and ijijijjijj LLKFkf /),()( ≡ . The first-order condition 
with respect to the investment decision implies that the capital-labor ratio is negatively related to the 
real user cost of capital (and is the same for all firms in a given sector; the i  sub-script is hence 
dropped below): 
marginal product of capital KKjjjijijjKj crpkfpLKFp ≡+=== )()(),( ' δ                                 (6a) 
The adjustment cost of labor, represented by h , creates a wedge between the marginal product of 
labor and the gross wage. Indeed, profit maximization entails that the marginal product of labor is 
equal to the sum of the gross wages, w , and the expected capitalized value of the firm’s hiring costs:  
marginal product of labor [ ] )( )()()(),( ' θλm rhwkfkkfpLKFp jjjjjjjijijjLj ++=−==                   (6b) 
 
joJ ,  and jvJ ,  being the present-discounted values of expected profit from an occupied and vacant job 
in sector j , respectively, Bellman equations lead to: 
)()(
,,, jvjojv JJmhrJ −+−= θ            )()()( ,,, jvjojjKjjjjo JJwkrpkfprJ −−−+−= λδ        (7)                      
In equilibrium, profit opportunities drive rents from vacant jobs to zero, i.e. 0
,
=jvJ , implying that 
profits from occupied jobs are the same in both sectors: 
r
wFp
m
hJ jjLjjo +
−
== λθ )(,                                                                                    (8) 
Let jeW ,  and uW  denote the present-discounted value of the expected income stream of an employed 
worker in sector j and of an unemployed worker, respectively. It follows that: 



−++= ueeu WWV
V
W
V
V
mzrW 2,
2
1,
1)(θθ                                                            (9a)                      
)(/
,, ujejje WWwrW −−= λρ                                                                              (9b)                      
where z  and ρ  denote unemployment benefits and the tax wedge between gross and net of labor tax 
wages, respectively.6 Equation (3) implies that the sector shares in total vacant positions are equal to 
                                                 
6
  This type of framework typically ignores how unemployment benefits are financed and taxes spent. 
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their respective sector employment shares, jes , . Using the expression of jeW ,  in (9b), equation (9a) 
becomes: 
                                 



+
−
+
+=



−


+
+
+
+


+
+
+
+=
u
uueueu
W
r
r
r
w
mz
WW
rr
w
sW
rr
w
smzrW
λλ
ρθθ
λ
λ
λ
ρ
λ
λ
λ
ρθθ
/)(
//)( 22,11,
 
where w  is the average wage, and therefore: 
)(
/)()(
θθλ
ρθθλ
mr
wmzr
Wr u ++
++
=            )(
)/(/)()(/))((
, θθλ
λρθθλρθθλ
mr
rwwmwmrz
Wr jjje ++
+−+++
=     (10) 
 
The negotiated wage in each sector is the outcome of the Nash bargaining which boils down to 
maximizing the weighted product of the worker’s and the net firm’s surpluses from the match, the 
weight γ  representing workers’ bargaining power: ( ) γγ ρ −−−= 1
,,,
/)()(maxarg jvjoujej JJWWw .                      
The first-order maximization condition satisfies: ( )ργ /)()(
,,,, jvjoujeuje JJWWWW −+−=−  which, 
using equations (8) and (10) and after some manipulations, leads to: 
)(
))((
1
)()(
θ
θθλ
γ
γρλ
θθ
m
mrh
zww
r
m
w jj
++
−
+=−
+
+                                                     (11) 
This proves that wages are the same across sectors: www ≡= 21 . In short, this result stems from the 
perfect mobility of unemployed workers and the assumption that both sectors have the same labor 
market characteristics. It enables to preserve all features of the one-sector model, as shown now. 
 
It is straightforward to derive the expressions of the wage-setting and labor demand schedules from 
the above analysis. Using the equality of wages across sectors, equation (11) simplifies into: 
wage setting:     

 +
+
−
+= )(1 θ
λθ
γ
γρ
m
rhzw                                                     (12) 
This positive relation between tightness and bargained wages is the wage-setting curve.  
 
Combining (6a) and (6b) for the numeraire good defines a negative relationship between the marginal 
product of labor and the user cost of capital, )( δ+≡ rpc KK :  
                         0)(',)()(
)(
222 <−==
+
+ kcgcg
m
rh
w KKθ
λ
                                                 (13) 
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where )())(()( 1'21'222 KKKK cfccffcg −− −≡  depends on the characteristics of the numeraire good 2. 
For a given user cost of capital, this expression implies a downward-sloping relationship between 
wages and labor-market tightness, which is similar to labor demand:7 
labor demand:       0',)()(/)( 22 <−=+ gwcgmrh Kθλ                                           (14) 
  
The wage-setting and labor-demand curves define the unique equilibrium determining labor market 
tightness as a function of the cost of capital and of the parameters characterizing labor market 
institutions: 
labor market equilibrium:   [ ]zcg
hm
r
K ρ
γ
θ
λθγ −−=++ )(1)( 2                                            (15) 
which ensures that the following sensitivities are satisfied: 
0,0,0,0,0,0 <
∂
∂
<
∂
∂
<
∂
∂
<
∂
∂
<
∂
∂
<
∂
∂
λ
θθθ
ρ
θθ
γ
θ
hrz
                                      (16) 
or equivalently given (4),  
0,0,0,0,0,0 >
∂
∂
>
∂
∂
>
∂
∂
>
∂
∂
>
∂
∂
>
∂
∂
λργ
u
h
u
r
uu
z
uu
                                        (17) 
 
This extension of the Pissarides’ matching model to a two-sector framework still captures the main 
features of the regulation view. Workers’ bargaining power, and therefore, union density, is positively 
related to the unemployment rate, because a greater union power tends to push up wages, which 
reduces labor demand. An increase in the unemployment benefits leads to an increase in the 
unemployment rate, as it improves the outside option of workers in the bargaining process and 
therefore boosts wages. For the same reason, unemployment is positively related to the tax wedge, 
but only to the extent that an increase in the tax wedge, which drives down net wages, is not offset by 
lower unemployment benefits, i.e. to the extent that the wedge between net wages and benefits is 
reduced.8  
                                                 
7
 Section 3 shows that the focus on sector 2 is not restrictive: equilibrium conditions ensure that the reciprocal relation derived 
from sector 1 is actually identical (see below). 
8
 Employment protection can be seen both as increasing the vacancy costs and as decreasing the separation rate. The former 
has a positive impact on the unemployment rate, while the latter has a negative one. Therefore, employment protection has an 
ambiguous effect overall in this framework.  
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3. Relative labor market institutions with respect to trading partners 
The purpose of this section is to introduce trade in this set-up, thus providing a theoretical framework 
in which the labor market institutions of trade partners affect a country’s unemployment rate. Davis’ 
(1998) rationale is followed closely by combining the two-sector matching model, developed in section 
2, with the standard trade framework under homothetic preferences, keeping in mind that good 1 is 
assumed to be relatively capital intensive at any factor prices. Sub-section 3.1 deals with autarky and 
sub-section 3.2 with the open economy.  
 
3.1 Autarkic equilibrium 
In order to understand how factor endowments determine equilibrium unemployment based on 
domestic labor market regulation, it is convenient to explore the relationships between the user cost of 
capital and the unemployment rate in detail, first by focusing on the labor market, then on the product 
market.  
 
What is the effect of changes in the user cost of capital on the unemployment rate in this two-factor 
framework, as a result e.g. of a change in relative endowments? According to the expression of the 
labour market equilibrium (eq. 15), an increase in the cost of capital triggers an increase in 
unemployment. Figure 1 represents the labor market equilibrium based on the labor-demand and 
wage-setting schedules. The equilibrium is initially at (E0). An increase in the cost of capital is 
associated with a shift in labor demand, which results in lower wages and higher unemployment. The 
new equilibrium is at (E1), and the mechanism is the following. A greater user cost of capital means a 
lower capital-labor ratio in both sectors such that the marginal product of capital increases to match 
the rise in the user cost. This adjustment in the capital-labor ratio is associated with a decrease in the 
marginal product of labor, )(/)( θλ mrhw ++ , which results in a decrease in both wages and labor 
market tightness along the wage-setting schedule, hence a rise in unemployment. This mechanism by 
which an increase in the user cost of capital is associated with a higher unemployment level (and 
reciprocally for a decrease in the user cost) plays a key role in the open economy through changes in 
factor prices that are induced by trade with countries having either different labor market institutions or 
different factor endowments.  
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In sum, the labor market equilibrium defines a positive relationship between the unemployment rate 
and both the cost of capital Kc  and the level of (unfavorable) labor market regulation ( LMR ), which 
represents unemployment benefits, the tax wedge, the cost of search, etc.: 
labor market equilibrium (RR) :      0/0/,),( >∂∂>∂∂= LMRcLMRcu KKRR ααα         (18) 
The function α  captures the main features of the regulation view. It depends only on labor market 
institutions and the production functions (see eq. 15, and footnote 10 below), i.e. not directly on the 
country’s factor endowments which effects on unemployment are channeled through the product 
market equilibrium only and the resulting capital cost level. The positive relation between the user cost 
of capital and the unemployment rate is represented by the positively-sloped RR curve in Figure 2, 
where R stands for regulation. The discussion in the previous section implies that an increase in (bad) 
regulation shifts the RR curve to the upper left. This RR curve holds for both autarky and trade 
equilibrium as it depends only on labor market regulation and technological parameters. 
 
In autarky, the product market equilibrium through demand for both goods determines the cost of 
capital as a function of employed factor endowments. Indeed, according to the Heckscher-Ohlin 
theorem, there is a negative relation between the price of the capital intensive good and the effective 
capital-labor endowment:  
0',
1)1( <


−
=



−
= ζκζζ
uuN
Kp                                                                                  (19) 
where K  is the country’s capital stock, N  the labor force, and NK /≡κ  denotes relative 
endowments.  
 
As long as the country produces both goods, the Stolper-Samuelson type-relation, adapted here to 
take into account the adjustment costs to labor, still implies a positive relation between Kc  and p .9 
Indeed, as shown in the previous section, wages and therefore the marginal products of labor are 
equalized across sectors at equilibrium, which implies: 
 )/()()()( 11112222 pcgpkckfpkckfcg KKKK =−=−=                                              (20a) 
                                                 
9
 Using Samuelson (1962)’s terminology, the equilibrium factor price Kc  is obtained at the intersection of the factor price 
frontier of both goods at price p . 
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where 1g  is the counterpart of 2g  for good 1.
10
 Given that good 1 is capital intensive (i.e. 21 kk >  at 
any factor prices), equation (20a) implicitly defines a positive relation between the relative price p  of 
the capital intensive good and the user cost of capital as differentiation leads to: 11  
                        
K
K
KK
K
c
dc
kk
kk
p
dp
2212
212
)1(
)(
αα
α
−+
−
=                                                                                                           
This also captures the well-known result that absolute changes in the user cost amplify absolute 
changes in the relative price of the capital-intensive good. This positive relation between the cost of 
capital and the price of the capital intensive good (eq. 20a) is denoted: 
0/',)( >>= pcpc KK ψψ                                                                                  (20b) 
 
The Heckscher-Ohlin and Stolper-Samuelson theorems (eq. 19 and 20b) characterize the product-
market equilibrium, which implies a negative relationship between the unemployment rate and both the 
cost of capital and the price of the capital-intensive good: an increase in the unemployment rate, by 
reducing the effective labor available to the economy, makes the labor intensive good relatively more 
expensive, hence a decrease in both Kc  and p :
12
 
product market equilibrium ( ABD ) :    0',)(0',)(/1 1 <=⇔<−= − ϕϕςζκ KBDABDA cupu    (21) 
Importantly, both decreasing functions only depend on the technical parameters of the production 
functions, on the relative factor endowment NK /≡κ  and on preferences. This means that labor 
                                                 
10
 Equation (20a) can also be written as )/()/( 111222 pcgppcgp KK = , which makes it clear that the focus on good 2 to 
characterize the labor market equilibrium (eq. 15) is innocuous as product market equilibrium links the user cost of capital to 
good prices based on the properties of both production functions. For example, (15) could be written as well as 
[ ]zpcgphmr K ργθλθγ −−=++ )/(/)1()(/)( 1 . 
11
  In this model, the usual properties of the Heckscher-Ohlin model, e.g. those linking changes in factor prices to changes in 
good prices are preserved, provided that wages are adjusted to take into account adjustment costs. That is, the appropriate 
price of labor should be taken as )(/)( θλω mrhw ++≡ . Differentiating (12) leads to 
[ ]dwmrmmrdmmrhdwd )')(²/(')(/)1(1²/')( +−+−−=+−= λλγγθλω , which shows that wages and the 
adjusted labor price ω  move in the same direction (given that 0'<m ). One can check that when the match is perfect      
( θθ ∀= 1)(m ), dwd =ω or when 0→h , then +∞→θ  (i.e. 0→u ) and given (1) 0'→m and dwd =ω  also.  
12
  It should be noted that the framework is a static one. Taking the dynamics of capital accumulation into account would amplify 
these mechanisms because of the substitution of capital to labor.  
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market regulation does not affect this relation, which is labelled as the BD locus in Figure 2, where BD 
stands for Brecher-Davis, while A  stands for autarky in eq. 21. Therefore, the autarkic equilibrium is 
defined at the intersection of the BD and RR schedules: 
)(,)(/1,),(
,
1
, AAKAAAKA pcpuLMRcu ψζκα =−== −                                  (22) 
For example, a more stringent regulation moves the (RR) curve on the upper-left, increasing the 
unemployment rate while reducing the cost of capital (and the price of the capital-intensive good) 
along the (BD) locus. Reciprocally, a decrease in capital endowment moves the (BD) curve towards 
the upper-right, increasing the cost of capital (and p ) and the unemployment rate along the (RR) 
locus.  
 
3.2. The magnification effect of trade 
 
The mechanism highlighted by Davis, who treats the case of trade between a minimum wage and a 
flexible wage economy, is now extended to the labor market framework presented above. Suppose 
that two countries having the same relative factor endowments and preferences open up to trade: 
*
*
*
*
*
NN
KK
N
K
N
K W
+
+
≡=≡=≡ κκκ  where the * and W superscripts refer to the foreign country and the 
world, respectively. In that case, both countries share the same BD locus in the closed economy, 
which is also the BD relation in the integrated equilibrium linking the price p  to the world employed 
factors: 
)(/1,)(/1,)(/1 1,*1*1 pupupu WBDTBDABDA −−− −=−=−= ζκζκζκ                           (23) 
In autarky, the low regulation equilibrium is represented at point A* in Figure 2 for the foreign country. 
In the domestic country, assumed without loss of generality to have a more stringent regulation, the 
autarkic equilibrium settles at a point like A along the common BD locus. Stricter regulation implies a 
larger unemployment rate, and both a lower user cost of capital and price p : *AA uu >  and *AA pp < . 
Consequently because regulation affects relative prices it creates comparative advantages even if 
factor endowments are identical.  
 
Let )/( *NNNs +≡ be the share of the domestic country in world labor force. The world RR curve is 
given straightforwardly as follows, since the world unemployment rate Wu  is equal to *)1( usus −+ : 
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 (RR WT ):      ),()1(),()1( **, LMRcsLMRcsususu KKRRRRWRRT αα −+=−+=                    (24) 
Hence, the trade equilibrium is defined by: 
[ ] [ ] )(/1),()1(),(
)(,),(,),(
1*
,
*
,
*
,
TTT
TTKTKTTKT
pLMRpsLMRps
pcLMRcuLMRcu
−
−=−+
===
ζκψαψα
ψαα
                                     (25) 
 
It follows that trade amplifies the regulation-induced differences in unemployment rates between 
countries. Indeed,  *ATA ppp ≤≤  implies, according to eq. (23), that 
)()()( ***, ABDAATWBDTWTABDAA puupuupuu =≥=≥= : in the trade equilibrium, the world unemployment 
rate lies in between the autarkic rates.  Also, based on the RR curves, AARRTRRT upupuu =≥= )()( , 
and reciprocally .** AT uu ≤  Hence, 
**
TA
W
TAT uuuuu ≥≥≥≥                                                                                                  (26) 
The trade equilibrium is represented in Figure 3A. 
 
As a result, from autarky to trade, changes in the output mix induce the (BD) locus to shift rightwards 
for the domestic high-regulated country and leftwards for the foreign low-regulated country. Indeed, for 
a given level of unemployment in the foreign country, *u  , equation (23) implies:13 
)(/1)1( 1* pusus BDT −−=−+ ζκ                                                                   (27) 
This defines the (BD) locus in the trade equilibrium for the domestic country, in which the domestic 
unemployment rate is inversely related to the foreign unemployment rate as follows: 
( TBD ) :  0,0,),()(/11
*
*
1
* <
∂
∂
<
∂
∂
≡
−
+
−
−=
−
pu
pu
s
p
u
s
s
u BDT
µµµςκ                  (28a) 
Reciprocally, for the foreign country:  
( *TBD ) :  0,0,),(
1
)(/1
1
**
*
1
* <
∂
∂
<
∂
∂
≡
−
−
+
−
−=
−
pu
pu
s
p
u
s
s
u
BD
T
µµµςκ              (28b) 
the BD schedules being linked by: 
             )()()(/1)()1()( *1* pupuppuspus BDABDABDTBDT ==−=−+ −ζκ                                   (28c) 
                                                 
13
 I am especially grateful to one anonymous referee for having suggested this formalization. 
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With trade, each country’s BD curve depends on the other country’s effective endowments, i.e. the 
other country’s unemployment rate. Therefore, as an alternative to eq. (25), the trade equilibrium can 
be characterized by: 
),(,)(,),(,),( *
,
*
,
*
, TTTTTKTKTTKT puupcLMRcuLMRcu µψαα ====              (29) 
As one can easily verify that the autarky (BD) loci are given by ),( AAA puu µ=  and 
),(),( ****** AAAAA pupuu µµ == , equations (28a-c) imply the aforementioned shifts from autarky to trade. 
The  underlying channel is specialization through trade along the following line.  
 
Due to differences in labor market regulation, this world behaves as if Home is relatively capital 
abundant. At the domestic autarky price, foreign demand for the capital intensive good increases, the 
more so the lower the regulation in the foreign country (as it implies a higher *Ap ). The resulting boost 
in the Home price of the capital-intensive good generates an increase in the user cost of capital, which 
rises unemployment. Due to labor market rigidities, supplying more of the capital-intensive good can 
only happen if the domestic economy becomes effectively more capital abundant by shifting resources 
to the capital-intensive sector, thus generating an increase in unemployment.      
 
Figure 3B illustrates how the BD curves shift with trade. Equilibrium in the domestic and foreign 
country are shown in the North-East and South-East quadrant, respectively, with autarky at points A 
and A*. The assumption that both countries have the same relative factor endowments is reflected by 
both countries having the same (symmetric in the chart) (BD) locus in autarky. Because the domestic 
country has a more stringent labor market regulation, the autarkic unemployment rate is higher than in 
the foreign country. The integrated equilibrium W settles at a price Tp , which lies somewhere between 
Ap  and *Ap  based on the relative size of the two countries. The North-West quadrant represents the 
negative relationship between the unemployment rates in both countries at price Ap  and Tp  
according to ),( * Apuu µ=  and ),( * Tpuu µ= , respectively. Finally, the South-West quadrant uses 
the 45 0  line to transform the foreign unemployment rate from the North-West to the South-East 
quadrant. Starting from App = , the domestic RR curve implies Auu =  and, according to 
),( * Apuu µ= , Auu =* , which in turn based on RR* would mandate a price Appp =>*  clearly 
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inconsistent with the trade equilibrium. Any point on the South-West of A along the domestic RR 
schedule will produce a similar outcome. Price convergence occurs therefore at a price such as Tp  
whereby the equilibrium in each country moves along their respective RR locus at points T and T*: 
because the domestic country specializes in the capital-intensive good, the BD locus shifts rightwards 
for the domestic country and leftwards for the foreign country according to (28a-c).14 In the domestic 
country, trade induces a joint increase in the user cost of capital and the unemployment rate, while the 
converse applies to the foreign country, leading to the aggregated unemployment rate Wu .  
 
In this model the unemployment rate of a given country is therefore negatively related to the regulation 
level of its trading partner.15 Hence, the qualitative results obtained by Davis are extended to a more 
general context, with one noticeable difference. In Davis, the low regulation country has flexible wages 
and therefore no unemployment in autarky, as well as in the trade equilibrium. With labor market 
frictions, the low regulation country benefits from trade with a high regulation country in terms of 
employment, through a decrease in the user cost of capital, which boosts labor demand. Davis’ special 
(and extreme) case, where regulation is limited to minimum wages in one country, is obtained as 
follows, with 2/1=s . The labor market in the flexible economy implies puT ∀= ,0* , while the binding 
minimum wage in the rigid one induces AT pp = . Hence, [ ] AATTT uppuu 2)(/12),( 1* =−== −ζκµ  : 
the unemployment rate doubles in the domestic country. Davis’ case is quantitatively extreme as eq. 
(26) implies that with 2/1=s  the doubling of the unemployment rate in the rigid country is an upper 
bound. 
 
 
 
                                                 
14
  Factors are supposed to be immobile internationally in the Heckscher-Ohlin context. This can be problematic if K is explicitly 
thought of as physical capital. However, in such a case, low return to capital in the “rigid” economy would lead to capital outflows 
that would shift the BD schedule rightwards. This would produce similar results to the case of trade without capital mobility, 
because factor mobility is a substitute for trade in this model.   
15
 If there remain some impediments to trade, full convergence to the world price is not complete. As a result, the equilibrium 
would be somewhere between A and T for the domestic country and between A* and T* for the foreign country, depending on 
the level of trade costs. 
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4. North-South trade 
 
4.1. One North, one South 
When countries have different relative factor endowments ( NS κκ < ), labor market institutions 
contribute to the establishment of comparative advantages on top of those driven by endowment 
differences. Ns  being the share of North in the world labor force, the world RR schedule is still given 
by:  
(RR WT ):      ),()1(),(, SKNNKNWRRT LMRcsLMRcsu αα −+=                                       (30) 
Differences in relative endowments imply that the two countries have different BD schedules: 
    )(/1,)(/1 1,1, SSSBDANNNBDA pupu −− −=−= ζκζκ                                                (31) 
The world trade BD curve, )(/1)( 1, ppu WWBDT −−= ζκ , is thus a weighted average of the countries’ 
autarkic BD curves as SNNNW ss κκκ )1( −+= :     
(BD WT ):     )()1()()(/1)( ,,1, puspusppu SBDANNBDANWWBDT −+=−= −ζκ                          (32)                  
Hence, it is a general feature that the integrated RR and BD schedules are the labor-force-weighted 
average of the countries’ (autarky) schedules. As a result, the trade equilibrium price Tp  is given by 
eqs. (30) and (32), with )(
, TTK pc ψ= .               
                           
Given labor market regulation in both countries, North will have a comparative advantage in the 
capital-intensive sector if it is effectively capital abundant: 
S
A
N
ASNS
A
N
A
u
u
pp
−
−
>⇔<
1
1
κκ . With trade, the 
North BD locus shifts as follows, given eq. (32): 
0,0,),()(/11
1
, <
∂
∂
<
∂
∂
≡
−
+
−
−=
−
pu
pu
s
p
u
s
s
u
N
S
N
SN
N
W
S
N
N
NBD
T
µµµςκ                              (33) 
while the trade equilibrium is now given by:  
)(,),(,),(,),(
,,, TTKT
S
T
NN
T
S
TK
S
T
N
TK
N
T pcpuuLMRcuLMRcu ψµαα ====      (34) 
Assume first that both countries have the same regulation, with North being capital rich / labor scarce 
relative to South. Differences in relative endowments imply that the BD schedule differs between the 
two countries in autarky, and autarky equilibrium is at a point like N in North and S in South in Figure 
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4: the labor abundant country has both a higher cost of capital and unemployment rate. As a result of 
specialization, the integrated equilibrium is at a point like W on the common RR schedule, ensuring 
convergence of the unemployment rate across countries according to (18) as a result of price 
convergence. In this model with search frictions, trade leads to an increase in unemployment in the 
labor scarce country and to a decrease in the labor abundant country, a result that bears some 
resemblance with the analysis of Davidson et al. (1999), and is consistent with the Hechscher-Ohlin 
framework of Dutt et al. (2009) even though the settings are different.  
 
When differences in labor market regulation are brought into the picture, comparative advantages are 
driven by both differences in endowments and in labor market institutions, with the total effect 
combining those in Figure 3 (differences in institutions only) and Figure 4 (differences in endowments 
only): high regulation in the developed country relative to the developing country amplify the 
endowment-driven comparative advantages, whereas the latter would be attenuated, and potentially 
reversed, if the developing country highly regulates. 
 
4.2. Two North, one South 
The final case investigates the impact of trade with a labour-intensive country (South) on a pair of 
developed countries (North, domestic and foreign) with low- and high-regulated labor market. The BD 
locus in the trade equilibrium is still given by )(/1)( 1, ppu WWBDT −−= ζκ  
)()1()()1()( ,*,, puspusspuss SBDANNBDANNBDAN −+−+= , where s  is the share of the domestic country 
in North labor force, which implies: 
 (BD NT , ):     ),,()(/111 *
1
* puu
ss
p
u
ss
s
u
s
s
u SN
N
W
S
N
N
BD
T µ
ςκ
≡
−
+
−
−
−
−=
−
                                   (35) 
Provided that each of the three countries produces both goods, the full equilibrium is given by: 
)(,),,(
),(,),(,),(
,
*
,
*
,
*
,
TTKT
S
TTT
S
TK
S
TTKTTKT
pcpuuu
LMRcuLMRcuLMRcu
ψµ
ααα
==
===
                          (36) 
 
As in Davis, it is helpful to start from the equilibrium corresponding to free-trade between the 
developed countries, as represented in Figure 3, then to introduce of a previously isolated labor-
intensive country, South, and apply the North-South analysis developed in the previous sub-section. If, 
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given labor market regulations, South maintains a comparative advantage in the labor-intensive good, 
i.e. if NNSA pp > , where NNp  is the price in the North-North equilibrium, the world cost of capital will 
increase from its North-North level triggering an increase in unemployment in both Northern countries 
along their respective RR schedule. Contrary to Davis, the high-regulated developed country does not 
absorb the whole shock. In contrast, the user cost will fall from its autarky level in South, inducing a 
decrease in unemployment. Compared with autarky, unemployment raises unambiguously in the high-
regulated developed country. In the low-regulated developed country, however, trade with North and 
with South produce opposite effects, such that the overall change in unemployment is undetermined.  
 
5. Conclusion 
There is ample evidence that a country’s labor market institutions are important determinants of 
unemployment, either directly or through the propagation of shocks. This paper contributes to the 
growing awareness that, with globalization, the institutions of trading partners matter also for a 
country’s equilibrium unemployment rate. Because labor market institutions affect relative prices, they 
contribute to comparative advantages and boost or weaken demand for labor intensive goods 
depending on differences in labor market regulations between countries. When labor markets work 
perfectly, wages adjust to ensure full employment. In contrast, in the presence of rigidities, shifts in 
sectoral demands affect unemployment.  Consequently, trade might magnify the consequences of the 
institutional setting on total employment.16  
 
Davis (1998) highlights such a mechanism in a Heckscher-Ohlin trade model between two developed 
countries with identical factor endowments, in the special case where one country has a flexible-wage 
and the other a minimum-wage labor market. This paper asks whether Davis’ results extend to the 
workhorse labor market search framework of Pissarides (2000), which is embedded into a two-sector 
context. In Davis, trade between these two countries induces a doubling of unemployment in the 
minimum-wage economy while full employment is maintained in the flexible country. With search-
generated unemployment, it is shown herein that the unemployment rate increases in the high-
                                                 
16
  Eventually trade might  “discipline” labor market institutions; Boulhol, Dobbelaere and Maioli (2010) provide some evidence 
that rising imports from developed countries exerted downward pressure on workers’ bargaining power in the United Kingdom.  
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regulation country (although it less than doubles), but decreases in the low-regulation one. When trade 
with a developing country is brought into this setting, comparative advantages result from both relative 
factor endowments and relative labor market institutions. Assuming that South specializes in the labor 
intensive sector, unemployment increases in both developed countries relative to their respective 
North-North integrated trade equilibrium levels. Hence, the specific Davis’ case in which the minimum 
wage of its Northern trading partner insulates the flexible-wage country from the (negative) impact of 
trade with South on total employment does not hold any more. In fact, unemployment might even rise 
more in the low-regulation country, albeit from a lower level, depending on the specific parameters of 
both labor markets.    
 
Confirmation of these theoretical results could have important policy implications. Economic 
integration might foster labor market deregulation because of the dissuasive costs of maintaining a 
high level of regulation in the open economy. In addition, incentives to non-cooperatively deregulate 
the labor market might be reinforced with integration and, by anticipation, the desire to preserve the 
so-called “social models” might create resistance to opening up to low-regulation economies. Also, 
deregulating the labor market might generate a negative externality for trading partners, raising the 
possibility that cooperation in setting labor market policies enables to reach a better equilibrium.     
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Figure 1 
Labor market equilibrium and the impact of  
an increase in the user cost of capital 
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Figure 2 
Regulation view in a two-sector model 
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Figure 3A 
Trade between two countries having identical relative factor endowment 
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Figure 3B  
Trade between two countries having identical relative factor endowment 
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Figure 4 
Trade between two countries having identical labor market regulation,  
but different relative factor endowments 
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